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Upstairs Downstairs
Cabot Bank* was one of the 20 biggest banks in the United States in 1998. It had both large retail and
commercial banking operations, with branches in several states and many countries around the world.
Retail business had more than doubled in size over the past decade, mostly through the acquisition of
smaller banks. Every day, 2.8 million checks were deposited in its branches and automatic teller
machines.
But industry consolidation and other factors were placing Cabot and its competitors under increasing
pressure to improve check-processing efficiency. The number of checks passing through Cabot’s doors
had increased dramatically, up from 1 million in 1988. Yet, Federal Reserve regulations mandated that
customers have access to deposits within two days for checks drawn on local banks and that the actu-
al paper check be returned to the bank on which it was drawn. Speed was also important in minimiz-
ing the cost of “float” or the period of time after the deposit was credited to the customer but before
Cabot collected the funds. And deregulation in the banking industry had dramatically intensified the
competitive pressure to reduce costs and provide customers with new and better services.
Cabot responded by introducing two new computer technologies: check imaging (photographing
checks and storing the images on computer) and optical recognition software (scanning and capturing
the dollar amounts on checks and deposit slips). As one of the first U.S. banks to adopt check imaging,
this immediately put Cabot in the forefront of the industry. 
How Introducing Computer Technology Changed
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But introducing the new technologies would do more
than increase productivity and reduce costs; it would also
change the tasks performed by Cabot’s workers and the way
those tasks were organized into individual jobs—with great
potential impact on employees. Would workers perform-
ing processing require greater skills and receive higher
wages after the reorganization? Or would the job require
fewer skills and lead to a decline in pay?
As computers have gradually become an integral part of
almost every workplace, such questions have taken on a new
significance—significance that goes beyond the workers in
Cabot Bank or even in the banking industry. A substantial
body of research finds that the rising use of computers in the
modern economy is associated with an increased relative de-
mand for educated workers, both in the United States and
in other industrialized countries. Consequently, computer
technology has been identified as one factor responsible for
the sharp rise in wages paid to college-educated workers
compared to those with less education and, therefore, an im-
portant reason for the marked increase in income inequali-
ty that has occurred over the past 25 years. 
Exactly how and why does the introduction of comput-
ers result in these outcomes? Is it simply that machines sub-
stitute for less-skilled workers and reduce the demand for
their labor? Or is the explanation more subtle? And perhaps
just as important, is the chain of events inevitable? Or do
managers have the latitude to influence the design of jobs,
and consequently skill requirements and wages? 
To begin to answer these questions, we followed what
happened in two departments of Cabot Bank that were re-
organized when the new computer imaging technology was
introduced—downstairs in deposit processing and upstairs
in exceptions processing. We found that computer-based
technology did indeed create strong pressure to substitute
machines for people in certain tasks—those that can be de-
scribed by procedural or “rules-based” logic. However, this
typically left many tasks to be performed by people. In those
instances, we found that Cabot’s management played a key
role—at least in the short run—in determining how the tasks
were reorganized into jobs, with important implications for
skill requirements and wages. 
SKILLS AND COMPUTERS
Why do we see a correlation between computers and an in-
creased demand for high-skilled labor? The simplest argu-
ment, often seen in the popular press, is that computers sub-
stitute for low-skilled labor in carrying out tasks. In the
economics literature, researchers have argued that intro-
ducing computers increases the productivity of highly ed-
ucated workers more than it does the productivity of work-
ers with less education. Both explanations imply an increase
in demand for highly skilled workers relative to those with
fewer skills. 
But other researchers emphasize that the connection be-
tween computers and skill is more complicated. They point
out, for example, that “skill” is a multifaceted concept that
is not reducible to a single dimension. Which task is more
skilled: conducting biological research or managing a large
organization? Both are complex and difficult, each in very
different ways. One thing they do have in common is that
they require a great deal of problem solving. Yet, other ac-
tivities—walking across a crowded room or carrying on a
conversation with many voices in the background—are also
highly skilled tasks, even though people master them with
little conscious thought. As the late scientist and philoso-
pher Michael Polanyi observed, “We do not know how to
do many of the things we do.” 
How does this link up with what computers do? In most
commercial applications, computers perform tasks that can
be fully described as a series of logical programming com-
mands (“if-then-do”) that specify what actions the machine
will perform and in what sequence at each contingency.
(One notable exception is the self-organizing neural net-
works sometimes used in data mining.) Since if-then-do
tasks include many relatively simple back office activities,
such as recording and managing information, this is con-
sistent with the empirical evidence that adopting comput-
ers is associated with a decline in the percentage of high
school graduates in an organization’s workforce.
At the same time, computer scientists have been relative-
ly unsuccessful to date at programming computers to per-
form many activities that are unskilled by the definition that
most humans can do them with little or no training. Com-
monplace manual tasks, such as mopping a floor, maneu-
vering a vehicle through traffic, or removing staples from
checks are examples. These tasks have proven surprisingly
difficult to automate because they require optical recogni-
tion and adaptive fine motor control that are still poorly un-
derstood and cannot (yet) be described by a computer pro-
gram. Like walking across a crowded room, these are also
among the many activities that fit Polanyi’s observation. Al-
though these tasks do not require workers with a formal ed-
ucation, a switch to computer-driven machinery for these
jobs is not likely any time soon. 
In addition, computers can typically only address known
problems; contingencies unanticipated by the programmer
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will result in a dead-end. So computers cannot yet carry out
many of the problem-solving tasks that managers and pro-
fessionals tackle routinely. However, computers may in-
crease a skilled person’s productivity in accomplishing these
tasks by speeding the search and retrieval of information.
For example, bibliographic searches may increase the qual-
ity and efficiency of legal research, timely market informa-
tion may improve the efficiency of managerial decision mak-
ing, and richer customer demographic information may
increase the productivity of salespeople. 
Rapid advances in computer technology—and accom-
panying rapid price declines—create strong pressures to
computerize tasks that can be described as a sequence of
if-then-do tasks. At the same time, the impact of comput-
ers on the organization of work is not deterministic. Typi-
cally, there is more than one way to organize into jobs the
tasks that are not computerized. In these cases, managerial
decisions can play a significant role, at least in the short run,
in determining the organization of work and hence the skill
requirements of jobs.
CHECK PROCESSING AT CABOT
Fifty years ago, banks did all the sorting, balancing, post-
ing, and handling of deposits and exceptions by hand with
the aid of mechanical adding machines. The first major wave
of technological change came with Bank of America’s in-
troduction of Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR)
in the early 1950s. Using MICR, a bank could give cus-
tomers checks and deposit slips with bank and account
numbers imprinted in machine-readable magnetic ink.
Companies including General Electric, Remington, and
IBM developed reader-sorter machines that could read the
information and sort checks according to the banks on
which they were drawn. This reading/sorting was an early
example of computers substituting for human labor.
Until the mid 1990s, the Deposit Processing Department
at Cabot centered on the job of the proof machine operator.
The Cabot processing center would receive a package of
several hundred checks from a customer, the local super-
market for example, including a deposit slip and adding ma-
chine tape. The proof machine operator would remove the
paper clips and staples from the checks, make sure that each
check faced in the same direction, key in check amounts,
and, finally, add the checks and verify that the sum matched
the total on the deposit slip. If the totals did not match, she
would examine the adding machine tape and the encoded
check amounts to find and correct errors such as a keying
error by the proof machine operator, a listing error by the su-
permarket employee, or a check lost in transit. Then, the
checks were sent to a machine to be sorted them by account
number. 
Checks requiring individual attention were sent upstairs
to the Exceptions Processing Department. These included
checks written on closed accounts, checks for amounts
greater than the account balances, checks with stop pay-
ments on them, checks written for amounts large enough
to require signature verification, and fraudulent checks.
About 3 percent of checks fell into one of these categories.
In contrast to deposit processing, exceptions processing was
organized into a number of narrowly defined jobs. For ex-
ample, if the employee who verified signatures on large
checks found a discrepancy, that person filed a paper form
that led to further action by another worker with greater de-
cision-making authority. A check could pass through three
or four levels before reaching someone empowered to make
a decision. Another group of workers processed stop-pay-
ment orders, and still another group handled checks re-
turned for insufficient funds. In each case, a significant por-
tion of the day was spent shuffling paper to find the right
checks in boxes of newly delivered items, or to move checks
from one group to another. Since all work was done under
deadline, this created substantial employee frustration.
As in deposit processing, female high-school graduates
held most of the jobs in the exceptions department. Turnover
was high—30 percent a year—tolerable only because the
skills required were minimal and could be learned quickly.
Long-term employees developed expertise in one task, but
had little knowledge of the work outside their immediate
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area. As one manager commented, “People checked their
brains at the door.”
As Cabot began acquiring new banks and the daily vol-
ume of checks rose sharply, the cumbersome workflow cre-
ated even greater delays and poor service. For example, cus-
tomers who were short of cash would sometimes buy time
by writing multiple checks and then issuing multiple stop-
payment requests. Depending on the timing, each check
might trigger an overdraft exception and a stop-payment ex-
ception. If a check were large enough, it also would trigger
a signature verification exception. Each of the three clerks
involved would have only a partial picture, and each would
have to locate the same paper check to complete the pro-
cessing. In the end, the customer might be (incorrectly)
charged with both a stop-payment fee and an overdraft fee.
If the customer called to resolve the situation, there was no
single person with all the relevant information who could
handle the problem. 
In an effort to surmount these shortcomings, Cabot Bank
introduced check imaging and optical recognition software
both upstairs in exceptions and downstairs in deposit pro-
cessing in 1994. With check imaging, a high-speed camera
makes a digital image of the front and back of each check
as it passes through the reader-sorter, and the images can be
stored on a central computer. Optical recognition software
reads and stores check and deposit slip amounts. The new
technology removed two major bottlenecks. First, paper
checks no longer needed to be passed from one worker to
another; the information on every check was simultaneous-
ly available to any authorized employee in either of the two
departments. Second, it reduced the time that proof machine
operators spent reading and recording the amounts on
checks and deposit slips, an extremely labor-intensive task.  
But this still left many tasks that did not lend themselves
to automation because they could not be fully described in
a sequence of if-then-do steps. Managers of the two de-
partments were responsible for determining how these re-
maining tasks would be configured into jobs.
INCREASED SPECIALIZATION DOWNSTAIRS 
In deposit processing, Cabot Bank managers reorganized
tasks and jobs according to a standard template recom-
mended by its imaging equipment vendor. Under the tem-
plate, a check first goes to a preparation area where work-
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Imaging technology made it cheaper to divide the rout
The introduction of check imaging and optical recognition software reduced the number
of employees downstairs from 67 to 53. It also resulted in more specialized jobs, with check
preparers earning
less than proof machine
operators had, and
image balancers and
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ers remove paper clips and staples and make sure that all
checks face in the same direction. Workers then deliver the
checks to a machine that performs several processes: it mag-
netizes the ink on the MICR line, reads the check, sprays
an endorsement and sequence number on the back, micro-
films the front and back, and sorts it based on routing in-
formation. Finally, optical recognition software scans ma-
chine-printed and handwritten numeric amounts, identifies
them, and stores the information. (As of 1999, the software
successfully identified the amounts on about 57 percent of
imaged checks.)
The template also includes processes for when a dollar
amount cannot be recognized by the software. The check
image is sent to the screen of a high-speed keyer who tries
to identify the amount by looking at the numerical image
on the right side of the check. If the high-speed keyer is still
not sure of the amount, he or she passes the check image
electronically to a low-speed keyer. This operator looks at
the image of the whole check and, by comparing the nu-
merical representation to the amount written in words, de-
termines the value and keys it in. Once in the system, mul-
ti-check deposits are compared with deposit slips
automatically. When discrepancies arise, a worker whose ti-
tle is “image balancer” tracks the images electronically and
performs the error detection and correction that was formerly
done by the proof machine operator. 
The resequencing of the tasks of deposit processing sug-
gests that as computers reduced the cost of moving check
information between workers, it became cheaper to divide
the tasks previously performed by the proof machine oper-
ator into several specialized jobs. More specialized jobs led,
in turn, to a modest increase in wage dispersion in the de-
partment; the wage for each job depended, in part, on the
scarcity of the relevant skills within the workforce. Remov-
ing staples and ensuring that checks all face in the same di-
rection are tasks that most adults with average eye-hand dex-
terity can accomplish with no training. The hourly pay for
this job, $9.51, was the lowest in the bank’s two departments
and about 5 percent less than proof machine operators had
made before the reorganization. (See table.)
Image balancing required somewhat scarcer skills. Like
the proof machine operator, the image balancer must be able
to figure out why some deposits do not balance. But the im-
age balancer must know how to use computers and how to
do the work using electronic images instead of paper checks.
Managers in deposit processing recruited former proof ma-
chine operators because they had already demonstrated the
requisite problem-solving skills. The bank provided 36
hours of classroom training followed by two weeks of sup-
port from an experienced image balancer. In the end, most
proof machine operators made the transition, suggesting that
modest amounts of training could impart the requisite com-
puter skills. In 1998, the average pay of the image balancers
was $11 per hour, 16 percent more than the rate for check pre-
parers and about 10 percent more than proof machine op-
erators had earned previously. 
The department’s highest wages were paid to the best
keyers. The bank had an economic incentive to hire and re-
ward workers who keyed rapidly, since this reduced the
number of keying workstations the bank needed to purchase
and maintain. While check preparers and image balancers
were paid an hourly rate, keyers were also paid a bonus
based on speed and accuracy. (Keying performances could
now be monitored by computer, which simplified the de-
termination of bonuses.) The best keyers earned $13.50 an
hour, $2.00 per hour more than image balancers. This com-
paratively high wage reflected the relative scarcity of the skill
of recognizing and recording check amounts extremely
rapidly and accurately. 
The introduction of computers into deposit processing
led to the replacement of high school graduates by machines.
The number of workers needed per million checks dropped
from 67 to 53, and the share of departmental employees with
an education beyond high school—primarily managers—
increased. (Because acquisitions led to rapid growth in the
number of checks processed, job reductions were accom-
plished without layoffs.) The substitution of machines for
less-skilled workers is likely to increase as the character-
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recognition software improves and more checks can be read
by machine. Similarly, changes in regulations that permit
banks to provide customers and banks with images of
checks, rather than the checks themselves, may eliminate
the jobs of many low-skilled workers who package checks
for transit. Finally, since keyers no longer work with paper
checks, there is no reason why they need to be located where
the checks are digitized. Competitive pressure may push
much of the less-skilled clerical work to low-wage, offshore
locations, with significant job loss for less-educated work-
ers in the parent plant. One bank, Sun Trust, recognizing
that its keying operation outside Atlanta was particularly ef-
ficient, began transmitting images of checks from many sites
around the country to Atlanta for keying. 
INTEGRATING RESPONSIBILITIES UPSTAIRS
Upstairs in exceptions processing, the introduction of com-
puter technology was handled differently. Managers be-
lieved that check imaging would produce large efficiency
gains even with no other changes because employees would
be able to spend less time searching for paper and more time
resolving exceptions. But the vice president in charge of the
department was determined to accomplish more. He
thought that a broader reorganization of tasks and jobs could
improve productivity and customer service, and result in
better assignments using more skills. In his words: “fewer
people doing more work in more interesting jobs.”
He also believed that getting employees involved in the
job redesign would use their knowledge and gain their com-
mitment to the new system. Even before imaging technol-
ogy was implemented, managers held focus groups asking
workers about the aspects of their jobs that were irritating
and seeking advice on changes that would make the jobs
better. The consensus: work should be divided by customer
account not exception type, and the same representative
should deal with all exceptions—stop-payment requests,
overdrafts, and so on—for a given account. In that case, a
clerk who saw a stop payment order would be able to an-
ticipate a possible (incorrect) overdraft exception as well as
other exceptions from the same account. Although the re-
organization would not be cost-free—employees would
spend 80 hours in training (40 hours in the classroom and
40 hours on the job) to learn to handle the full range of ex-
ceptions—management accepted the plan.
While the new account-based workflow was designed in
anticipation of check imaging, the bank began implemen-
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tation before imaging technology came on line. The imme-
diate result—a surprise to managers—was a major im-
provement in productivity. Before the reorganization, 650
workers processed the 65,000 exceptions each day; after the
reorganization, this workload took only 530 workers. Giv-
en the productivity gains, we wondered why Cabot had not
tried this earlier. Managers told us that Cabot had been fo-
cused on absorbing newly acquired banks and, therefore,
had not considered such a reorganization. It is also possi-
ble that the reorganization of work became compelling only
when managers knew that the gains would be enhanced by
the additional savings that image processing made possible.
Once imaging was introduced, exceptions processing be-
came even more efficient. Clerks no longer spent time shuf-
fling paper checks or searching for a check when answer-
ing a query from a branch bank. One year later, the number
of workers had fallen to 470, a 28 percent decline overall.
Reorganization accounted for about two-thirds of produc-
tivity gains, new technology for the other third. Because the
department had high turnover, staff reductions were
achieved through attrition. As in deposit processing down-
stairs, almost all of the 180 positions eliminated were held by
high school graduates. 
In contrast to deposit processing, however, the reorgani-
zation in exceptions processing led to formerly specialized
jobs being combined into broader ones. And since excep-
tions processing clerks now had more extensive training and
could handle a wider variety of tasks—skills valued by
Cabot’s competitors—management decided it was prudent
to pay higher wages. The average wage for lower-level, non-
supervisory workers rose from $10.64 an hour in 1988 to
$13.50 in 1998. Most workers were also moved up a pay
grade after they completed training. In addition, manage-
ment steadily increased the proportion of employees they
classified as “exempt,” that is, workers who were required
to work independently, show initiative, or supervise oth-
ers. Before the reorganization, 20 percent of the unit’s work-
ers were exempt; by 1998, the number was 35 percent.
Management also expanded the range within each pay
grade. For example, grade 23—a grade to which many rep-
resentatives were initially assigned—had a 1993 range of
$17,800 to $26,300 but a 1998 range of $18,900 to $37,100.
The greater pay range reflected the firm’s belief that em-
ployees had greater scope for judgment and initiative in the
redesigned job. In particular, management wanted to mo-
tivate employees not only to do their own complex jobs well,
but also to recommend additional design improvements.
Said the vice president, “If you transform your job in a pos-
itive way, you will get a raise. If you transform your job and
have a positive impact on the people around you, you will
get a promotion.” Although expanding the pay range may
simply have reflected external market forces that were lead-
ing to greater wage dispersion throughout the economy,
there was no comparable expansion within each pay grade
downstairs in deposit processing.
Also somewhat different was the response to the demand
for higher skills that the reorganization engendered. Al-
though training went a long way, particularly in imparting
the relevant computer skills, many managers upstairs found
that the ability to “see the whole picture” was difficult to
teach. Accordingly, Cabot restructured its recruiting process
in exceptions processing to identify job candidates with a
history of taking initiative and problem solving. For exam-
ple, they asked prospective hires to describe problems they
had encountered in previous jobs or in school and how they
resolved them. Candidates were also interviewed by super-
visors from several groups and could only be employed if
multiple supervisors vetted the hire. In the words of one
manager, “[recruits] have to be right for the whole bank.”
Managers in exceptions processing reported that the new
recruiting process favored applicants who had at least some
college education. Had managers retained the narrow task
structure, computerization certainly would have eliminat-
ed the jobs of many high school workers engaged in the “pa-
per chase.” But the broader job responsibilities also spurred
managers to recruit college graduates into the department,
something they had not done before. 
Was the new job design inevitable? Seemingly not, at least
sive training and higher payin the short run. Management had considerable discretion
to either broaden the exceptions processing job or leave the
previous job design intact. Some banks have kept jobs in ex-
ceptions processing specialized by function, even after in-
troducing check imaging. Not enough time has elapsed to
judge whether the different ways of organizing work in ex-
ceptions processing reflect equally productive ways of or-
ganizing the tasks, or whether competition will reveal that
one way is more efficient than others. But we suspect that
Cabot Bank’s choice effectively takes advantage of the in-
terdependencies among exceptions-processing tasks and
will be rewarded by the market in the long run. 
CONCLUSION
So why did things at Cabot turn out one way downstairs and
another way upstairs? Research by Professor Assar Lind-
beck of Stockholm University and Dennis Snower of the
University of London suggests that managers combine tasks
into broader jobs when the tasks are complementary and cre-
ate single-task jobs that take advantage of specialization
when they are not—for example, in Adam Smith’s pin fac-
tory. It seems likely that the reason new technology result-
ed in narrower job definitions in the Deposit Processing De-
partment downstairs at Cabot Bank is that there was little
complementarity among the tasks. Once imaging reduced
the cost of moving check information from one worker to
another, it made sense to exploit economies of specializa-
tion. On the other hand, complementarity among tasks in
the Exceptions Processing Department upstairs made task
integration attractive. 
This appears not to have been the only consideration,
however. Upstairs managers also seemed to have the explicit
goals of making jobs more interesting and in involving the
workers in the redesign. MIT Professor Paul Osterman has
pointed out that where managers care about the quality of
customer service and the well-being of employees, we tend
to see integrated job designs. S
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letter from
Jaffrey, New Hampshire
By Jane Harrigan § Begin with a
glittering silver chrysanthemum,
1,000 feet wide, exploding over the
Washington Monument on the
Fourth of July. Proceed to Boston,
where, with each cymbal crash of
the “American Symphony,” the pis-
tils of giant red flowers strobe 1,000
feet above the Charles River. Take
your pick of 700 other fireworks
displays from Miami to Minnesota
to Montreal. If you could follow a
string of colored stars from all these
productions back to their source,
the trail would end at a tan, brick,
and metal building on a rural road
in southwestern New Hampshire.
Here, behind a door guarded by
jade lions, the 22 employees of At-
las PyroVision Productions choreo-
graph the displays that illuminate
the nation.
Here in Jaffrey, population 5,500,
handmade shells designed to Atlas’s
specifications arrive from Spain and
Japan and China and accumulate in
three concrete-walled magazines
holding 60,000 pounds of explo-
sives each. Here, the latest comput-
er equipment calibrates the preci-
sion firing of a crude product that
has changed little since the Chinese
invented gunpowder over 1,000
years ago.Here, Stephen Pelkey,
Business is kabooming